

1 HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
8 AT TACOMA

9 THE VICTORY CENTER, et al.,

10 Plaintiffs,

11 v.

12 CITY OF KELSO, et al.,

13 Defendants.

No. 3:10-cv-5826-RBL

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[Dkt. #28]

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16 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
17 [Dkt. #28] and Plaintiffs' Response and Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #34]. After
18 careful review of the pleadings, declarations, and briefing in support of both motions,
19 Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs' motion is denied.

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21 **I. BACKGROUND**

22 The Victory Center is a nonprofit entity affiliated with the Kelso Church of Truth, a
23 Christian nondenominational congregation. Pls.' Compl. at 3–4 [Dkt. #1]; Decl. of Michael
24 Kerins, Ex. Q at 62 [Dkt. #30-1]. According to the Victory Center's articles of incorporation, the
25 entity's purpose is "[t]o hold educational sessions in life skills for youth and adults, cultural
26 events and conferences." Kerins Decl. at 62 [Dkt. #30-1]. In 2006, the Victory Center began its
27 operations in cohabitation with the Church of Truth at 401 Pacific Avenue South in Kelso,
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1 Washington. *Id.* It remained in this location until 2008, when the church and the Victory Center
2 relocated to Longview, Washington, a short distance from south Kelso. Pls.’ Compl. at 5 [Dkt.
3 #1].

4 During this time, the City of Kelso was working to update its zoning ordinances and
5 create a synergy among land uses in a small core of the city known as the Commercial Town
6 Center (CTC). Defs.’ Mot. at 3 [Dkt. #28]. In an effort to encourage pedestrian-oriented retail
7 activity on the street level within a four-block subarea of the CTC, the city amended its
8 Development Regulations in April of 2009. *Id.* at 4. The amended version of the zoning
9 regulations provide a table of allowable land uses within each zoning district, and it prohibits the
10 following uses within the CTC “on the ground floor on Pacific Ave., South between Oak and
11 Maple Streets”: recreation facilities, active; fitness centers and sports clubs; participant sports
12 and recreation—indoor; auditoriums, clubhouses, and meeting halls; community centers and
13 recreation facilities; religious facilities; family day care and child care centers; personal and
14 professional services; professional offices; and retail sales and services with screened outdoor
15 storage. KMC 17.15.020. The CTC zone allows—including on the ground floor of the four-
16 block subarea—most retail establishments, restaurants, and entertainment facilities, as well as
17 educational, cultural, or governmental uses.¹ *Id.*

21 In 2010, the property at 401 Pacific Avenue South became available after a martial arts
22 studio vacated the premises, and the Victory Center entered into negotiations to purchase the
23 property from Boyd Real Estate Investments. Defs.’ Mot. at 6. Because this address is located
24 within the CTC’s pedestrian retail area, Michael Kerins, the city’s Director of Community
25 Development, contacted Leonid Pisarchuk, the Victory Center’s authorized representative, to
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28 ¹ The table simply states, “Educational, cultural, or governmental.” Unlike other allowable uses, it is unclear exactly
what these adjectives are intended to modify.

1 advise him of the zoning changes. *Id.* About one month later, Mr. Pisarchuk signed a lease
2 agreement to rent the building. *Id.*

3 On July 19, 2010, the city served the Victory Center with a Notice of Zoning Ordinance
4 Violation. *Id.* Plaintiffs' counsel responded by letter and indicated the Victory Center was not a
5 church, but rather a cultural and educational center, and therefore compliant with the city's new
6 zoning regulations. *Id.* at 7. After reviewing the Victory Center's supporting documentation, the
7 city issued a formal interpretation of use; it concluded the Victory Center functioned more like a
8 community center, which is a prohibited use on the first floor of 401 Pacific Avenue South. *Id.*;
9 *see also* KMC 17.15.020.
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11 The Victory Center appealed this determination to the City of Kelso Hearing Examiner.
12 Defs.' Mot. at 7 [Dkt. #28]. Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing, and each
13 side was afforded an opportunity to present evidence, take testimony, and cross-examine
14 opposing witnesses. Kerins Decl. at 61 [Dkt. #30-1]. At the conclusion of testimony, the
15 hearing examiner continued the matter to allow both parties to provide supplemental briefing on
16 various legal issues that arose during the hearing. *Id.* at 62. Because the zoning regulations did
17 not expressly define "community center" or the words "educational, cultural, or governmental,"
18 each party presented definitions of "community center" and "cultural center" for the hearing
19 examiner's consideration. *Id.* at 66. The hearing examiner accepted the city's definitions of both
20 terms. *Id.* at 67. Next, the hearing examiner concluded "that the [Victory Center's] activities
21 constitute a 'community center' and as such are prohibited under the City's ordinance." *Id.* at
22 67.
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26 The Victory Center did not appeal the hearing examiner's determination and instead filed
27 this lawsuit. It alleges sixteen causes of action, including violations of the Religious Land Use
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1 and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA); free exercise, freedom of speech, freedom
2 of assembly, equal protection, and due process claims under the First and Fourteenth
3 Amendments to the United States Constitution and the corresponding articles of the Constitution
4 of the State of Washington; violations of the Washington Administrative Procedure Act; and
5 conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985–86. Pls.’ Compl. at 9–16 [Dkt. #1].
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7 The City of Kelso moves for summary judgment with respect to all sixteen counts. The
8 Victory Center has filed a response and motion for summary judgment with respect to the
9 RLUIPA and constitutional claims, and the Court will consider both motions concurrently.
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11 II. ANALYSIS

12 Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
13 the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary
14 judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to
15 summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to present, by affidavits, depositions, answers to
16 interrogatories, or admissions on file, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
17 trial.” *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of
18 evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient.” *Triton Energy Corp. v.*
19 *Square D Co.*, 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Factual disputes whose resolution would not
20 affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary
21 judgment. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words,
22 “summary judgment should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from
23 which a reasonable [fact finder] could return a [decision] in its favor.” *Triton Energy*, 68 F.3d at
24 1220.
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A. Issue Preclusion

The Victory Center is barred from arguing it is a cultural center within the meaning of the city's zoning regulations. The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues of fact or law that have been "actually decided" after a "full and fair opportunity" to be heard. *Robi v. Five Platters, Inc.*, 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988). The Victory Center argued it was a "cultural center" on appeal to the Kelso Hearing Examiner, who determined the Victory Center functioned more like a "community center." Kerins Decl. at 67 [Dkt. #30-1]. The Victory Center did not appeal this ruling, and it had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue. *See id.* at 68.

The Victory Center, however, is not precluded from arguing it is a religious assembly because the Hearing Examiner expressly declined to make a finding on this point: "The issue of whether RLUIPA applies is not properly before me as, again, neither party claims that the Victory Center is a 'religious assembly or institution' and, secondly, my jurisdiction does not extend to issues of federal regulation." *Id.*

B. RLUIPA Claims

In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) in response to the Supreme Court's decision in *Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872, 878–82 (1990), which held that the Free Exercise Clause "does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid laws of general application that incidentally burden religious conduct." *Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter*, 456 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA because it exceeded Congress's authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. *See City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997). Congress then wrote the Religious Land Use and

1 Institutionalized Persons Act so that it “would only apply to regulations regarding land use and
2 prison conditions.” *Guru Nanak*, 456 F.3d at 986. A number of Circuit Courts of Appeal have
3 upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA. *See, e.g., Guru Nanak*, 456 F.3d at 993–96 (“RLUIPA
4 is a congruent and proportional response to free exercise violations because it targets only
5 regulations that are susceptible, and have been shown, to violate individuals’ religious
6 exercise.”); *Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside*, 366 F.3d 1214, 1236–43 (11th Cir.
7 2004).

9 RLUIPA imposes two separate limitations on the government’s regulation of land use.
10 First, the government cannot impose “a substantial burden” on “a religious assembly or
11 institution” unless the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is
12 the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. §
13 2000cc(a)(1). Second, the government cannot impose or implement a land use regulation that
14 “treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly
15 or institution,” or “discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion,” or
16 “totally excludes” or “unreasonably limits” religious assemblies from a jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. §
17 2000cc(b).
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20 **1. Substantial Burden Provision Under RLUIPA**

21 The substantial burden prong of RLUIPA applies only if one of three conditions is
22 present: (1) if the land use regulation is imposed in a program or activity that receives federal
23 funding; (2) if the land use regulation’s burden affects interstate commerce; or (3) if the land use
24 regulation is imposed in a system where the government makes individualized assessments of the
25 property’s proposed use. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C). The Victory Center does not
26 specify which of the three threshold conditions is satisfied here, but the city acknowledges that
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1 “a zoning scheme requires . . . an individualized assessment . . . for each type of proposed land
2 use.” Defs.’ Mot. at 12 [Dkt. #28] (citing *Guru Nanak*, 456 F.3d at 987). Without inquiring
3 further, the Court assumes the substantial burden prong of RLUIPA applies to the City of
4 Kelso’s zoning scheme because the city makes individualized assessments of property use.

5 The next question is whether the scheme imposes a substantial burden on the Victory
6 Center’s religious exercise and, if so, whether this burden furthers a compelling governmental
7 interest in the least restrictive manner possible. The Victory Center bears the burden to prove the
8 city’s zoning regulations impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. *Guru Nanak*, 456
9 F.3d at 988. “For a land use regulation to impose a substantial burden, it must be oppressive to a
10 significantly great extent” and “impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon” religious
11 exercise. *San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill*, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)
12 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the burden must amount to “more than an
13 inconvenience on religious exercise.” *Midrash Sephardi*, 366 F.3d at 1227 (internal quotation
14 marks omitted).

15 The City of Kelso’s zoning regulations do not impose a substantial burden on the Victory
16 Center’s religious exercise because the Victory Center is free to locate its facility anywhere
17 outside the CTC’s four-block subarea dedicated to pedestrian retail activity. The Victory Center
18 could even locate its facility within this subarea anywhere above the first floor. The city
19 estimates that the restricted area represents less than one eighth of one percent of zoned land
20 within the city limits, Defs.’ Mot. at 4 [Dkt. #28], and locating outside of this small area does not
21 substantially impede the Victory Center’s ability to practice religious activities. In *Midrash*
22 *Sephardi*, two synagogues argued zoning regulations that prohibited religious facilities in seven
23 out of eight zoning districts imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise because the
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1 congregants would have to walk longer distances to attend services, putting a significant burden
2 on the ill, young, and elderly. 366 F.3d at 1227. The court sympathized with the congregants’
3 greater inconvenience but held that “walking a few extra blocks” is not “‘substantial’ within the
4 meaning of RLUIPA.” *Id.* at 1228. Similarly, the Victory Center has not presented any evidence
5 that 401 Pacific Avenue South bears any religious significance to the Church of Truth’s religious
6 tenets, and any burden imposed by the CTC’s land use restrictions is merely a matter of personal
7 or economic convenience. The statute does not impose an affirmative obligation upon the
8 government “to facilitate or subsidize the exercise of religion.” *Mayweathers v. Newland*, 314
9 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002).

11 The Victory Center relies on *Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment*
12 *Agency*, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002), for the proposition that a government imposes a
13 substantial burden on religious exercise when it restricts an assembly’s ability to lease a desired
14 space. In *Cottonwood*, the court took particular note of that church’s large and expanding
15 congregation—over 4,000 people—and concluded the redevelopment agency’s use of eminent
16 domain to acquire a property Cottonwood had planned to develop into a church imposed a
17 substantial burden on Cottonwood’s ability to practice its religion in a single location. 218 F.
18 Supp. 2d at 1226–27. The Victory Center argues there is no other comparable property in the
19 City of Kelso to perform its activities. This argument is unsupported in the pleadings and
20 filings, and it is unpersuasive. The Kelso Church of Truth has approximately forty congregants,
21 and the Victory Center has not advanced any compelling reason why this particular location is
22 better suited for its religious practices than any other nearby location. The City of Kelso’s land
23 use regulations do not constitute “more than an inconvenience on religious exercise.” *Midrash*
24 *Sephardi*, 366 F.3d at 1227 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the Victory Center has
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1 failed to carry its initial burden, the Court need not consider whether the regulations further a
2 compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive manner possible.

3 **2. Equal Terms Provision Under RLUIPA**

4 Separate and in addition to RLUIPA's substantial burden provision, the statute also
5 prohibits a government from "impose[ing] or implement[ing] a land use regulation in a manner
6 that treats a religious assembly on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or
7 institution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
8 construed the equal terms section of the statute. *See Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas*
9 *v. City of Yuma*, 651 F.3d 1163, 1170–73 (9th Cir. 2011). "Under the equal terms provision,
10 analysis should focus on what 'equal' means in the context." *Id.* at 1172. "The city violates the
11 equal terms provision only when a church is treated on a less than equal basis with a secular
12 comparator, similarly situated with respect to an accepted zoning criteria." *Id.* at 1173. If the
13 Victory Center establishes a prima facie case for unequal treatment, the burden then shifts to the
14 city to show otherwise. *Id.*

15 Any land use regulation that restricts religious exercise must be written narrowly to
16 achieve the government's intended and legitimate purpose. *See Centro Familiar*, 651 F.3d at
17 1174–75. In *Centro Familiar*, the court concluded Yuma's land use ordinance restricting
18 available property uses in the city's "Old Towne District" treated religious institutions on a less
19 than equal basis with similarly situated secular institutions because the zoning scheme permitted
20 "membership organizations" as of right while it required "religious organizations" to obtain a
21 conditional use permit. *Id.* at 1166–67, 1171 ("[T]he express distinction drawn by the ordinance
22 establishes a prima facie case for unequal treatment."). The city passed the ordinance in order to
23 limit restrictions on the issuance of liquor licenses within the Old Towne District, but the court
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1 held the ordinance’s language was too broad because it affected all religious activities, not just
2 churches (only “churches” implicated a 300-foot buffer for liquor licenses). *Id.* at 1174–75.

3 The city points out its zoning scheme does not restrict religious expression to this degree.
4 For example, the Victory Center could conceivably open a religious bookstore within the CTC’s
5 designated retail district. Defs.’ Mot. at 19 [Dkt. #28]. While this may be true, the Court’s
6 inquiry turns on whether Kelso’s land use restrictions treat the Victory Center “on a less than
7 equal basis with a secular comparator, similarly situated with respect to an accepted zoning
8 criteria.” *Centro Familiar*, 651 F.3d at 1173.

10 The first step in determining the “secular comparators” is to examine the Victory
11 Center’s activities, which focus on theology classes, social services, literacy and tutoring,
12 exercise and nutrition, and ministry services.² Thus, the Victory Center’s secular comparators
13 listed in the city’s zoning regulations are: community centers, club houses, meeting halls,
14 recreation facilities, fitness centers, and educational or cultural facilities. *See* KMC 17.15.020.
16 The zoning regulations equally exclude all of these comparators from the CTC’s designated
17 retail area, except for “educational, cultural, or governmental” uses. *Id.* It is unclear what the
18 city means by “educational, cultural, or governmental.” Without further development of these
19 terms, genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether the Victory Center, an entity
20 arguably engaged in educational and cultural pursuits, is treated on less than equal terms with
21 secular educational and cultural institutions that are free to locate within the CTC’s pedestrian
22 retail area.
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25 A finding that the city’s regulations violate the equal terms provision of RLUIPA as a
26 matter of law, however, would go too far. If the city had limited the allowable educational,
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28 ² For a more comprehensive “list of activities that the Victory Center presently undertakes . . . or has plans to
undertake,” *see* Kerins Decl., Ex. Q at 64 [Dkt. #30-1].

1 cultural, or governmental uses to retail purposes, the city would probably “demonstrate that the
2 less-than-equal-terms are on account of a legitimate regulatory purpose, not the fact that the
3 institution is religious in nature.” *Centro Familiar*, 651 F.3d at 1172. But because the city has
4 failed to articulate its justification for treating the Victory Center differently from nonretail
5 educational and cultural uses, this question remains open for finder of fact.

7 **C. Federal Constitutional Claims**

8 Next, Plaintiffs argue the City of Kelso’s exclusion of religious organizations from the
9 CTC’s pedestrian retail area violates provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
10 United States Constitution.

11 **1. Free Exercise of Religion**

12 The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, applied to the
13 States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provide that “Congress shall make no law respecting
14 an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
15 Laws that incidentally burden a particular religious practice, however, do not trigger heightened
16 judicial review if the law is “neutral and generally applicable.” *Church of the Lukumi Babalu*
17 *Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah*, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).

18 The Victory Center argues the city’s zoning regulations violate the First Amendment by
19 prohibiting the free exercise of religion within the CTC’s pedestrian retail area. The city, on the
20 other hand, couches the regulation as a permitted limitation that does not deprive the Victory
21 Center from observing its religious tenets. *See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n*,
22 485 U.S. 439, 449–51 (1988) (holding the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the government
23 from permitting timber harvesting and road construction in an area traditionally used for
24 religious purposes).

1 The city’s zoning regulations do not “prohibit the free exercise” of religion. Unlike the
2 law at issue in *Lukumi*, which prohibited an activity central to the Santeria faith (the ritual
3 slaughter of animals), the city’s zoning regulations do not prohibit or impede the Victory
4 Center’s ability to practice its religion. *See* 508 U.S. at 524–28. A religious organization does
5 not possess a “constitutional right to be free from reasonable zoning regulations.” *Messiah*
6 *Baptist Church v. Cnty. of Jefferson*, 859 F.2d 820, 826 (10th Cir. 1988). The city’s zoning
7 scheme does not offend the Free Exercise Clause because the zoning regulations only
8 incidentally burden the Victory Center’s free exercise, and the regulations are neutral and
9 generally applicable to other nonretail property uses.
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11 **2. Freedoms of Speech & Assembly**

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13 The First Amendment further provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
14 freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peacefully to assemble.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
15 Victory Center contends the City of Kelso’s zoning regulations unconstitutionally abridge its
16 right to engage in religious speech and assembly. This is an inaccurate assertion. Nothing in the
17 zoning regulations curtails the Victory Center’s ability to peacefully assemble and speak freely
18 within the CTC’s pedestrian retail area. Even if the Victory Center is unable to lease building
19 space on the first floor of this area, its members are still permitted to gather in the public spaces
20 and share Victory Center’s message with the public citizenry.
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22 **3. Due Process & Equal Protection**

23
24 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal protection under the law and protects
25 individuals from government deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due process of
26 law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Victory Center’s due process and equal protection
27 arguments merge, but the general grievance is that the City of Kelso’s zoning regulations
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1 impermissibly target religious institutions for discriminatory treatment and interfere with the
2 fundamental right of free exercise of religion.

3 The Due Process Clause provides the textual basis for unenumerated fundamental rights.
4 If a fundamental right has been infringed, the court must determine whether the law infringing on
5 the right is sufficiently related to a compelling governmental purpose. The free exercise of
6 religion is certainly a substantive due process right because it is enumerated in the First
7 Amendment, but the zoning regulations do not infringe the right. Therefore, there is no
8 substantive due process violation and the Court need not consider whether the law is narrowly
9 tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
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11 “Equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when
12 the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
13 the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” *Mass Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia*, 427 U.S. 307,
14 312 (1976) (citing *San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973)). Because the law
15 in question does not impermissibly interfere with the Victory Center’s free exercise rights,
16 heightened judicial review is triggered only if the classification “operates to the peculiar
17 disadvantage” of a suspect class. The Court concludes the Victory Center is not a member of an
18 established “suspect class,” such as a racial minority, that implicates either strict or intermediate
19 scrutiny. Thus, the zoning regulations must be sustained if they are rationally related to a
20 legitimate governmental interest.
21

22 Some classifications that disadvantage quasi suspect classes have been held to violate
23 equal protection principles under rational basis review, however. *E.g.*, *City of Cleburne v.*
24 *Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance that required a group
25 home for the developmentally disabled to obtain a special use permit while other groups could
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1 locate as of right); *Love Church v. City of Evanston*, 671 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding
2 an ordinance that required a church to obtain special use permit violated the Equal Protection
3 Clause). Even if the Court were to accept that the Victory Center is a member of a quasi suspect
4 class, the zoning regulations equally disadvantage nonreligious entities. *See* KMC 17.15.020.
5 Furthermore, the zoning regulations are rationally related to achieve a legitimate governmental
6 purpose, namely, to create a centralized retail synergy and encourage economic growth in the
7 City of Kelso’s downtown core. *See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim*, 452 U.S. 61, 68
8 (1981) (“The power of local governments to zone and control land use is undoubtedly broad and
9 its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality of life.”). The City of
10 Kelso’s land use regulations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
11

12 **D. State Constitutional Claims**

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14 The Constitution of the State of Washington protects “freedom of conscience in all
15 matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship.” Wash. Const. art I, § 11. This constitutional
16 protection does not guarantee “the right to be free of all government regulation,” however. *N.*
17 *Pac. Union Conference Ass’n of Seventh Day Adventists v. Clark County*, 74 P.3d 140 (Wash.
18 Ct. App. 2003). In evaluating land use and zoning restrictions that impede free exercise,
19 Washington courts “require a very specific showing of hardship to justify exemption from land
20 restrictions.” *Id.* at 32 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained in the
21 Court’s analysis above, the Victory Center simply has not made a specific or persuasive showing
22 of “hardship” that would implicate a state constitutional violation.
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25 **E. Violations of the Washington Administrative Procedure Act**

26 Washington’s Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA) governs state administrative
27 rulemaking and adjudication procedures. *See* RCW 34.15. The Victory Center argues the City
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1 of Kelso's land use determination was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the WAPA.
2 But the WAPA only applies to "state agencies" administering statewide programs. RCW
3 34.15.010; *Kitsap Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 7 v. Kitsap Cnty. Boundary Review Bd.*, 943 P.2d
4 380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). As a local municipality, the City of Kelso is not bound by the
5 WAPA, and the Court need not consider whether the City's determination of use was arbitrary
6 and capricious.
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8 **F. Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights & Failure to Prevent a Conspiracy**
9 **Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985–86**

10 The Victory Center has not provided any evidence of a conspiracy between Mr. Kerins
11 and the city to deprive the Plaintiffs of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. In fact, Mr.
12 Kerins began the process of amending the city's land use regulations, and the City Council
13 passed the amended regulations, *before* the Victory Center leased 401 Pacific Avenue South.
14 Defs.' Mot. at 21 [Dkt. #28]. There is no indication that the city sought to restrict available land
15 uses with the CTC's four-block subarea for any reason other than to encourage pedestrian retail
16 traffic, and certainly not to affirmatively discriminate against the Victory Center. Because the
17 Victory Center's section 1985 claim fails, its section 1986 claim for failure to prevent a
18 conspiracy also fails. *See Trerice v. Pederson*, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985).
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21 **G. Qualified Immunity**

22 The doctrine of qualified immunity protects city officials from personal liability for an
23 action taken in their official capacity so long as the action is objectively reasonable and does not
24 violate a clearly established federal right. *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Mr.
25 Kerins's effort to retool and subsequently enforce the City of Kelso's zoning scheme is
26 objectively reasonable and constitutes an official action within the scope of his position as
27 Director of Community Development. While the zoning regulations may or may not violate the
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
1 equal terms provision of RLUIPA, the Victory Center “must demonstrate that the contours of the
2 rights at issue here (constitutional and RLUIPA-derived) were sufficiently clear that a reasonable
3 official would understand that what he was doing violates those rights.” *Hale O Kaula Church v.*
4 *Maui Planning Com’n*, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1068 (D. Haw. 2002). The Court cannot say with
5 confidence that the contours of RLUIPA are sufficiently clear as courts continue to grapple with
6 the statute’s implications; thus, Mr. Kerins is entitled to qualified immunity.
7

8 **III. CONCLUSION**

9 For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #28] is
10 GRANTED IN PART with respect to all of the federal and state constitutional claims, the
11 substantial burden provision of RLUIPA, the conspiracy claims, and the WAPA claim.
12 Defendants’ motion [Dkt. #28] is DENIED IN PART with respect to the less than equal terms
13 provision of RLUIPA. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. #34] is DENIED.
14 Michael Kerins’s request for qualified immunity is GRANTED.
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16 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

17 Dated this 4th day of April, 2012.
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22 RONALD B. LEIGHTON
23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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